

State of Iowa

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# **Proposal for Capitol Complex Security**

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Security Review Committee  
Recommendations - September 1999

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### Project Direction

This compendium of information is in response to the Director of General Services -Richard Haines and Commissioner of Public Safety -Penny Westfall request to ascertain the security status of the State of Iowa's, Capitol Complex. This study will identify the present status, review ongoing projects, make recommendations and suggest a future direction of Complex Security.

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## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Penny Westfall - Commissioner - Dept. of Public Safety  
Richard Haines - Director - General Services

**FROM:** Security Review Committee

**RE:** Security Review Proposal - State of Iowa Capitol Complex

**Date:** September 3, 1999

Please find attached, information regarding your request for an update, assessment and recommendations of the existing Capitol Complex Security. This information has been compiled through the use of numerous agency personal with expertise in Law Enforcement, Human Resources, Security, Information Technology, Systems Technology, Legislative Oversight, Construction and Facility Management. Through these disciplines, a systematic approach was used to review needs and concerns of all affiliated agencies.

It is our goal that the outcome of this study will provide a datum for action and a heightened awareness of Capitol Complex Security. Today's workforce and workplace is an ever-changing environment. New employees, procedures and technology have set a rapid pace for everyone struggling to keep up with. In this fast paced climate, unplanned events often can and do occur, it is our hope to be good stewards of the States Facilities, employees and visitors of this ever present reality.

## Introduction of Committee Members

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Captain Robert O. Garrison | Executive Assistant to the Commissioner |
| Major Royce Anthony #26    | Director - Capitol Police               |
| Captain Steve Lambert      | Capitol Police                          |
| Cindy Morton               | Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance    |
| Jerry Gamble               | Executive Officer- General Services     |
| Edward Mahlstadt           | Administrator - Capitol Complex -DGS    |
| Mike Marshall              | Secretary of the Senate                 |
| Mark Willemsen             | Legislative Facilities Manager          |
| Craig Deichmann            | Facility Engineer- DGS                  |
| Kip Peters                 | I. T. - Security Coordinator            |
| Stephan Hampton            | AFSCME                                  |
| Deborah Babb               | OSHA-Compliance, Safety & Health        |
| Gregg Schochenmaier        | IDOP - General Counsel                  |

## Analysis of Existing Conditions

Since 1996 there has been 83 threat incidents on the Capitol Complex that have required intervention by the Capitol Police. These occurrences have included threats made by persons on site and over the telephone, during terminations, employee counseling and employment hearings.

There are approximately 6,000 employees working on the Capitol Complex that consists of 15 primary buildings sites and 19 parking lots covering an area of 180 acres. Complex security is staffed by 26 Capitol Police officers, two officers per shift are assigned to Terrace Hill and on average three are assigned per shift to the Capitol Complex.

Present security technology that exists is 86 proximity card readers and 6 cameras. The readers are distributed throughout the complex at entrances to buildings and internal secure locations (computer room, etc.).

General Services in cooperation with the Department heads in the Hoover Building are conducting a pilot program, requiring employees to wear picture identification and to pass through a semi-secure west entrance, which is staffed by a ILEA\* Certified receptionist. This position acts as an information officer, visitor screener, emergency contact and a monitor of the multiplex security cameras. These individuals are slated to be trained in customer service, workplace violence, dealing with irrational individuals and violence recognition.

Training on "workplace violence" is not mandatory but is provided to agencies on request from Capitol Police.

## Recommendations & Prioritization of Projects

The purpose of this proposal is to provide information on estimated manpower and equipment needs that would promote safety and security on the Capitol Complex.

- Increase security awareness through IDOP and its' training programs, SATE Class (Security Awareness, Training and Education). Presently being implemented by ITS for their staff.
- Identification Badges to be worn by all State employees while working on campus. Presently DGS and Hoover building occupants are participating in such a program.
- Installation of fifty-one additional observation cameras. Their use would bolster security in parking lots and remote buildings as well more sensitive areas (outside Governors' office).
- Initially staff six of the primary buildings with a centralized receptionist position. This person would be located at the entrance of a building and identify visitors and assist in finding their desired destination.
- Continuous monitoring (24-7) of complex multi-plex cameras by Capitol Police.
- Entrance sign in books and visitor identification badges to be coordinated by the centralized building receptionist.
- A third party view of security plans and procedures. Attain recommendations of a security assessment firm or agency to review procedures that this plan will implement as well as any added measures that they assessment may suggest.
- Complete review of all public and private access to the Capitol Complex tunnel system, what measure, if any, are needed to control this avenue into our buildings.
- Incremental installation of all recommendations over a period of years to help minimize budgetary impacts, measure outcomes and adjust to the changing needs within agency relocations.

## Cost Data

|                     | Wallace        | Grimes         | Hoover                 | Lucas#         | Capitol#       | Ola B.Bldg#   | Total          |
|---------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Receptionist        | 25,000         | 25,000         | 25,000                 | 25,000         | 25,000         |               | 125,000+       |
| Capitol Police*     | 42,922         | 42,922         | 42,922                 | 42,922         | 42,922         | 42,922        | 257,532+       |
| Equipment           | 48,410         | 47,646         | 30,000                 | 49,196         | 50,206         | 14,164        | 239,622        |
| Other **            | 30,000         | 30,000         | 50,206<br>Parking lots | 30,000         | 30,000         | 30,000        | 200,206        |
| Proximity & Readers | 5,200          | 5,200          | 5,200                  | 5,200          | 5,200          | 5,200         | 31,200         |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>151,532</b> | <b>150,768</b> | <b>153,328</b>         | <b>152,318</b> | <b>153,328</b> | <b>92,286</b> | <b>853,560</b> |

\*Refers to monitoring of cameras by Capitol Police

\*\* Refers to shared cost to install a centralized camera monitoring station.

+ This would be annual costs of \$382,532.00.

#The properties presently under construction would be the first to be wired.

## 5 Year Plan

|                        | 2001           | 2002           | 2003           | 2004             | 2005             | 2006             | Total            |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Capitol Police*        | 43,000         | 90,000         | 90,000         | 90,000           | 47,000           | 0                | 360,000          |
| Receptionist*          | 50,000         | 50,000         | 50,000         | 50,000           | 25,000           | 0                | 225,000          |
| Equipment**            | 71,111         | 72,000         | 73,000         | 73,000           | 73,000           | 73,000           | 435,111          |
| Other***               | 35,000         | 35,000         | 35,000         | 35,000           | 35,000           | 35,000           | 210,000          |
| Rolling Personal Cost. | 382,532        | 475,532        | 615,532        | 755,532          | 895,532          | 967,532          | 4,092,192        |
| <b>Total</b>           | <b>581,643</b> | <b>722,532</b> | <b>863,532</b> | <b>1,003,532</b> | <b>1,075,532</b> | <b>1,075,532</b> | <b>5,322,303</b> |

\*Refers to added staff for monitoring and reception areas.

\*\* These costs reflect completion of camera and monitoring equipment on complex.

\*\*\* Costs associated with proximity card installation and supplies.

## Summary

Recently, in School Violence Crisis Intervention Task Force meeting held with members of both state and local school officials, Bob Jester, managing school board insurance agent commented that, "the Littleton, Colorado, school district incurred \$50 million in expenses as a result of the shootings at Columbine High School, only half was covered by insurance".


In a State that is self-insured, the monetary and political fallout occurring from a such tragic event may be difficult to overcome. It is our hope that we never will be put in that position, but one must ask themselves the question if we were, as state stewards, what have our actions been to-date?

The committee's goal in this effort has been to heighten our awareness of this possibility and to arrive at an agreeable and workable solution. Through this awareness we hope to increase our police force from 26 officers to 6,000 informed employees, reduce incidents to zero and provide visitor friendly and secure traffic flow in all of the buildings.

To conclude, the recent shootings at the day-care center in California are indicative of what precautionary measures can provide. Prior to arriving at the day-care where the shootings took place, the shooter had stopped at two other day-cares to perform the act, the only difference, those two had security.



**Security Survey  
Iowa State  
Capitol Complex  
Des Moines, Iowa**



**Prepared by the  
United States Secret Service**



# Foreword

This report sets forth the findings and recommendations of a security survey conducted by the U.S. Secret Service for the Iowa State Capitol Complex in Des Moines, Iowa. This survey was conducted during the period of November 16, 1998 through November 19, 1998.

This survey was initiated upon a request from Commissioner Paul H. Wieck, Department of Public Safety, State of Iowa, in a letter dated August 12, 1998. Commissioner Wieck advised that the Iowa State Capitol Building was currently undergoing renovations. These renovations were nearing completion at the time this survey was conducted.

Director Lewis C. Merletti authorized this survey, and a team of Secret Service personnel was sent to Des Moines, Iowa to complete the task. This survey was conducted by Special Agent Charles Hull, Des Moines Resident Agency; Special Agent Richard Harrington and Security Specialist Stephanie Gentile, Special Investigations and Security Division; Physical Security Specialist James Moses, Technical Security Division; and, Visual Information Specialists Scott Callander, Andrew Obusek and John Twomey, Forensic Services Division.

The successful completion of this survey was made possible through the professional assistance and cooperation afforded the Secret Service by many employees of the State of Iowa. Special acknowledgement is given to Bill McKeag, David Ancell, Ed Daugherty, Bill Curler, Tom Johnson, George Howe, Royce Anthony, Sergeant Dan Wood, and Sergeant Angela Dalton for their invaluable assistance. The United States Secret Service gratefully acknowledges the contributions made by the many individuals who participated in this endeavor.

# Introduction

This survey was conducted at the State Capitol Complex in Des Moines, Iowa by the United States Secret Service.


The survey's findings are based on an analysis of the existing buildings, grounds, streets, vehicle and pedestrian traffic, and security practices and policies found at the complex. A variety of recommendations are offered, some of which would require additional personnel and budgeting for implementation. All recommendations need not be implemented to improve security. While certain recommendations are interrelated, many may be phased in gradually to provide a level of security that should rise as each incremental stage is reached.

The objective of this survey was to review the security procedures currently in place at the facility and provide recommendations that are intended to enhance the existing security procedures.

There is an understandable reluctance to restrict the access of the general public who wish to observe the state government at work. However, it is the state government's responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment from which to observe this process. Security is affected by a variety of issues. Levels of risk should be evaluated prior to determining what security measures should be implemented. Enhancing security requires the education, cooperation, and participation of those who work and visit the Iowa State Capitol.

# Grounds and Buildings

The Iowa State Capitol complex consists of seventeen (17) office buildings situated on 150 acres of state-owned property in the business district of the city of Des Moines. The Capitol building sits on a hill, about twenty-five feet above street level. The building is bordered by East 12th Street on the east, East 9th Street on the west, Walnut Avenue on the north, and Grand Avenue on the south. Each of these roads are bi-directional and handle a moderate to large volume of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.



Vehicular access to the complex is gained through one (1) driveway off of Grand Avenue, exiting onto Walnut Avenue. This driveway leads to the north and main (front) entrances of the Capitol building.

The Capitol building is a five (5) story structure that is patterned after the United States Capitol building in Washington, DC. The building was dedicated in 1884 and completed in 1886. It is constructed of limestone, granite, sandstone and brick, with dimensions of 363 feet by 246 feet. The Capitol dome is covered in 23 carat gold leaf.




The following entities are located within the Capitol building:

- ◆ The Office of the Governor
- ◆ The Office of the Lieutenant Governor
- ◆ The Capitol Rotunda
- ◆ The House Chamber
- ◆ The Senate Chamber
- ◆ The State Supreme and Superior Court Chamber
- ◆ The Offices of Members and support staff

There are approximately 800 full-time employees of the State Capitol, including state legislators. Each year the Capitol is visited by an estimated 80,000 people on public tours.

Pedestrian traffic within the Capitol complex and surrounding areas is free flowing and unrestricted. There is no statement of policy by the State of Iowa addressing access by the general public and/or demonstrators to the public areas of the Capitol complex.



## **RECOMMENDATION #1:**

Issue a detailed policy statement that addresses the specific number of general public/demonstrators allowed access to public areas of the Capitol complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #2:**

Require the Office of the Secretary of General Services to issue permits for demonstrations approved by that office for public areas of the Capitol complex.

No fences or walls separate the Capitol complex from the surrounding community and business areas. There are insufficient cameras and alarms in place on the complex grounds to ensure a properly controlled and monitored perimeter.

## **RECOMMENDATION #3:**

Install a perimeter fence around the Capitol complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #4:**

Install an outer perimeter alarm system as follows:

- ◆ Install an outer perimeter alarm system to provide early notification of intrusion in areas that are not actively patrolled by Capitol Police officers. Numerous types of technologies (e.g., microwave, infrared, ported coax cable, fiber optics, etc.) are available on the open market.
- ◆ Install a middle perimeter alarm system to detect any activity close to the buildings after hours.

## **RECOMMENDATION #5:**

Install cameras outside of the buildings to view the complex. These cameras should be used to provide surveillance of the outer perimeter, video assessment of perimeter alarms, and observation of perimeter posts.

Recommendations for the placement of these cameras will be addressed in the Technical Security section of this report.

Lighting on the grounds of the complex provides inadequate illumination for video assessment.



## **RECOMMENDATION #6:**

Increase lighting in and around the complex for video assessment and improved illumination in areas of heavy foliage.

Pedestrians are granted full and unchallenged access to the grounds, building and parking facilities located on the Capitol complex. During working hours, there are no physical barriers in place that would impede or restrict pedestrian access to any of the buildings within the complex. After hours, most, but not all, of the entrances to the buildings and parking facilities are locked or restricted to the general public. However, unchallenged pedestrian access is granted to all exterior grounds and plaza areas, thereby threatening the integrity of security within the complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #7:**

Increase manpower for exterior posting, during business and nighttime hours, to adequately control and monitor the complex and provide an increased physical presence.

There are twenty (20) exterior perimeter doors to the Capitol building. This number does not include the multiple interior access points from within the building to other buildings on the complex. All of the perimeter doors are functional from both the interior and exterior, and are utilized throughout the year. Some doors are seldom opened and the average occupant of the building is probably not even aware of the location. All entrance doors are available for use by complex employees, visitors, and the general public. Currently, there are no restrictions for access to any doors within the building.

## **RECOMMENDATION #8:**

Alarm each of the twenty (20) exterior perimeter doors.

## **RECOMMENDATION #9:**

Designate specific doors as entry/exit doors and secure the remaining doors for emergency egress only. Equip the emergency doors with alarmed "crash bars" with read-out directly to the Control Center.

## **RECOMMENDATION #10:**

Install duress “panic” alarms at all entry points, both manned and unmanned, with read-out directly to the Control Center.

## **RECOMMENDATION #11:**

Install and fully utilize an access control system at all designated entrances. Employee passholders would have access through any designated entry portal by using the access control system. Each entrance to the building should have restrictions on entry (i.e., Members would have unrestricted 24 hour access to all designated entrances; access for other employees/contractors would be restricted to specific doors during specified times, etc.).

## **RECOMMENDATION #12:**

Designate specific entry/exit locations for visitors and guests. Each building should have no more than two (2) visitor/guest entrances, one if the entrance can be handicapped accessible.

## **RECOMMENDATION #13:**

Establish a security post at each of the designated entrances. Equip each post with a screening area, house telephone, a walk-through magnetometer, an x-ray machine, a surveillance camera, and a duress “panic” alarm. The camera and alarm should read-out directly to the Control Center. Permanent passholders would pass unimpeded through the checkpoints through the access control system. All non passholders would be directed to the screening area where they would be issued a temporary pass, then cleared through the magnetometer with their packages screened through the x-ray machine.

The material construction of exterior doors varies from glass and metal to glass and wood.



## **RECOMMENDATION #14:**

All exterior doors should be constructed of solid wood or metal.

Locking hardware varies from door to door. High security locking hardware is not utilized throughout the complex. A key control system is lacking, thereby compromising the security of the complex. Alarms and crashbars are incorporated into a few of the doors, but in the event of an alarm, none of the doors are monitored by camera.

## **RECOMMENDATION #15:**

Establish a proprietary key system throughout the complex to ensure the integrity of the security system.

## **RECOMMENDATION #16:**

Design and implement a key control system and require the Capitol Police to maintain the system, thereby centralizing and controlling the issuance of keys.


## **RECOMMENDATION #17:**

Install a high security locking hardware system throughout the complex.

Additional recommendations for the key and locking hardware system may be found in the Technical Security section of this report.

The Capitol building has approximately 68 windows at the basement, ground and first floor levels that are easily accessible and very vulnerable. None of the ground accessible windows are monitored by cameras, and the majority of the windows are not alarmed.

Other windows, although not accessible from the ground, are also a security concern. These windows are located in the House and Senate Chambers, Membership briefing and conference rooms, and Members' offices. An object thrown by a demonstrator or disgruntled individual from the street, although not as destructive as an explosive device, could result in serious injury or death from the broken shards of glass.



### **RECOMMENDATION #18:**

Conduct a study of all windows accessible from the street level to identify which type of security feature should be installed on each window (e.g., which windows should have alarms or bars/cages installed versus windows that should be replaced with a higher quality window).

### **RECOMMENDATION #19:**

Install security bars/cages and/or alarms on all ground accessible windows.

### **RECOMMENDATION #20:**

Install cameras to monitor all exterior doorways and windows. Cameras should be installed in such a way that a minimal number of cameras are required to provide 100% coverage.

### **RECOMMENDATION #21:**

Install a protective coating on all exterior glass, such as mylar, or a similar coating. This will prevent shards of glass from flying throughout interior spaces in the event an object is thrown or if an explosive device is detonated.

## **RECOMMENDATION #22:**

Install volumetric magnetic or shock sensors on all ground accessible windows to provide 100% coverage of the building.

Vehicular access to, and parking on, the Capitol complex is granted in six (6) separate areas:


- ◆ Area 1 – VIP parking for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
- ◆ Area 2 – northwest lot; designated as employee parking #8 (gold)
- ◆ Area 3 – southwest lot; designated visitor parking
- ◆ Area 4 – southeast lot; designated as employee parking #14 (green)
- ◆ Area 5 – east lot; designated handicapped parking
- ◆ Area 6 – northeast lot; designated employee parking #13 (green)

Each of these parking areas presents unique problems for the overall physical security of the complex. Terrorist acts or embarrassing interruptions of daily governmental functions could be easily initiated from any of these areas.

## **RECOMMENDATION #23:**

Discontinue the practice of posting the title of parking space occupants on signs in the spaces. Instead, use numbers to assign parking spaces.

Parking area #1 is designated for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The lot is located just south of the main entrance to the Capitol building. Pedestrian and vehicular access to this location is completely unrestricted and easily gained 24 hours a day. Both privately owned and commercial vehicles routinely drive-up to the front entrance of the building to drop off or pick-up passengers. These vehicles enter the complex unchallenged at the entrance located off of Grand Avenue. If Capitol Police officers encounter the vehicle, it is after the vehicle has reached the upper level of the complex. There is no camera monitoring of this area.



## **RECOMMENDATION #24:**

Construct vehicular barriers at both the entrance and exit points to the main west-side entrance. These barriers should be constructed to withstand a vehicle weighing 25,000 pounds and traveling at 25 miles per hour.

## **RECOMMENDATION #25:**

Discontinue allowing commercial vehicles to drive-up to the front entrance of the Capitol building.

## **RECOMMENDATION #26:**

Require vehicles to pick-up and/or drop off passengers on the street.

## **RECOMMENDATION #27:**

Install seven (7) pan/tilt/zoom cameras with smoked enclosures in the following locations to randomly monitor west parking area including the entrances, exits and surrounding area:

- ◆ Install two (2) cameras on the northwest and southwest rooftop corners of the Senate Chamber.
- ◆ Install two (2) cameras on the northwest and southwest rooftop corners of the House Chamber.
- ◆ Install one (1) camera on the roof of the Rotunda facing west.
- ◆ Install two (2) cameras, one each, on the entrance and exit to the main entrance located on the west side of the building.

These cameras would also be capable of monitoring any crowds/demonstrators and should have sufficient lens capability to obtain detailed vehicle/pedestrian descriptions and/or identification when needed.

## **RECOMMENDATION #28:**

Enclose parking area #1 to prevent individuals from gaining access to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor's vehicles.

## **RECOMMENDATION #29:**

Restrict vehicular access to the main entrance to VIP's only (e.g., Governor, Lieutenant Governor and their guests, etc.).

Parking areas #2 and #3 are located on the west side of the Capitol complex. Area #2 is designated for visitor personnel and area #3 is designated for employee parking. A card access system was planned and installed for the purpose of restricting access to only authorized personnel, however this system appears only to be used periodically. Parking areas #4, #5, and #6 are located on the east side of the Capitol complex. Areas #4 and #6 are designated for employee parking. Area #5 is designated for handicapped parking. All three lots are relatively close to the Capitol building. A van filled with explosives, such as the one utilized in the World Trade Center bombing could cause severe critical damage to the Complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #30:**

Verify all access gates are in proper working condition and the key card access control system is functioning properly.

## **RECOMMENDATION #31:**

Due to building proximity, require full utilization of the access control system.

## **RECOMMENDATION #32:**

Due to the parking lots proximity to the state capital, require vehicles carrying handicapped persons to make prior arrangements with the Capitol Police before gaining access to parking area #5.

## **RECOMMENDATION #33:**

Strictly enforce parking regulations. Parking enforcement is not only a good security practice, but allows for vehicle identification and the ability to contact vehicle owners in the event of an emergency.

All packages and deliveries (i.e., United States Postal Service, Federal Express, etc.), are made directly to the Capitol complex. No security screening is conducted.

## **RECOMMENDATION #34:**

### **Option A:**

Establish a remote delivery site. All deliveries to the Capitol complex should be made to an off-site facility where the materials are screened by x-ray machines, hand searches by officers, police canine units, etc. After screening, manifests should be verified, the cargo sealed, delivery information passed to loading dock personnel at the Capitol complex, and finally, trucks directed to report to the complex for delivery. This would allow posted officers to expect the delivery, have knowledge of the cargo, and allow for advanced notification to the recipients. Upon arrival, the officer would remove the seal and allow the delivery to proceed. This process would considerably reduce the number of delivery vehicles entering the complex.

### **Option B:**

Develop security procedures to address deliveries to the complex.

- ◆ Require the schedule, contents and destination of deliveries be reported to the Capitol Police in advance of the vehicle's arrival. Prohibit the admittance of any vehicle, state or commercially owned, to the complex that has not been approved by the Capitol Police.
- ◆ Conduct limited background investigations (e.g., criminal records checks, etc.) on the core group of delivery persons who require recurring access inside the complex.
- ◆ Purchase x-ray machines for use by Capitol Police officers, with assistance of personnel from the House/Senate mailrooms, to screen mail and packages delivered to the complex.

# Technical Security

Security systems and devices enhance the overall physical security environment by combining specialized technical equipment and specific physical security procedures. This section addresses the following technical security areas with associated recommendations for implementing a technical security program within the Iowa State Capitol Complex:

- ◆ Control Center/Technical Staff
- ◆ Intrusion Detection Alarm Systems
- ◆ Office Intrusion Alarm System
- ◆ Duress "Panic" Alarm Systems
- ◆ Locking Hardware and Key Control Systems
- ◆ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems
- ◆ Explosive Ordnance Detection and Disposal
- ◆ Physical Barriers
- ◆ Armoring Systems
- ◆ Air Shafts and Air Handling Systems
- ◆ Tunnel Security
- ◆ Emergency Power

Fire safety systems and technical surveillance countermeasures were not addressed in this security survey.

Although technical security systems are not intended to replace manpower, they can often provide greater efficiency in the way security personnel are utilized. Many technical security systems can be implemented and made aesthetically pleasing. In most cases the casual observer will not even know a technical security system is present. Although most physical security systems can be costly, they provide an improved security environment that may be made available by no other means.

Presently the Iowa State Capitol Complex consists of several buildings that surround the Capitol building. In order to implement technical security systems, consideration should be given to the consolidation and/or relocation of offices (e.g., computer rooms, financial transaction offices, check printing offices, file/record storage areas, etc.) that require a higher level of security from those with limited security requirements. This will maximize the efficiency of the system while proving more cost effective.

Currently, some offices have security systems in place, however, the police force was unaware of some of these systems. Implementation of security systems must be a coordinated effort between the offices, the police force, and management.

## **RECOMMENDATION #35:**

Consolidate the following offices into the same building:

- ◆ State Tax records office
- ◆ Check Processing Area
- ◆ Law enforcement

## **RECOMMENDATION #36:**

Relocate public access offices to the ground floors of the building(s). Restrict public access to the upper floors to appointments only.

## **RECOMMENDATION #37:**

Establish an information desk in the lobby of public access buildings to assist in the monitoring of building access.

# **Control Center**

A centralized, communications control center is crucial to the administration and maintenance of physical security. The purpose of the control center is to safely and effectively monitor the employees, general public, and environment of the entire complex with as much ease as possible for the police officers manning the room. The control center also serves as the single, central contact for the Governor and the State Government in the event emergencies arise in or around the complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #38:**

Establish a centralized, communications Control Center for the monitoring of physical security systems within the complex, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Control Center should be placed in a secure area, possibly in the basement of the Lucas Building, where the current police department center exists. A temporary control center would need to be established while the permanent facility is being constructed.



The officers would be responsible for monitoring:

- ◆ Communications (radio, telephone, fire department, emergency response, State and local Police Departments, post emergency drop "crash" phones, etc.)
- ◆ Alarm Systems (all exterior and interior intrusion detection alarms, all duress panic" alarms, utility/environmental system alarms, etc.)
- ◆ CCTV and video recording
- ◆ Cable TV (current local news and CNN news broadcasts)

### **RECOMMENDATION #39:**

The Control Center should be staffed by a minimum of three (3) police officers and/or dispatchers per shift, for alarm, CCT, and communications monitoring.

## **Technical Staff**

Consideration should be given to establishing an Office of Security headed by a Chief of Security and manned by technical support staffed trained in the various technical security systems, devices, practices and policies. The benefits would include reduced cost for long-term outside contractor technical support as well as a more timely response for installation and maintenance.

### **RECOMMENDATION #40:**

Establish a Chief of Security position and obtain a qualified person to fill the position. The Chief of Security would be responsible for the administration of the complete security program, to include coordination of the police force, for the Capitol complex.

### **RECOMMENDATION #41:**

Obtain a qualified staff of trained technical personnel to install and maintain the various technical security systems and devices. This staff would be responsible for coordinating and monitoring the design, procurement and installation of the initial security system.

# Intrusion Detection Alarm System

Intrusion detection alarm systems are the heart of any physical security system. The system monitors the alarm status, the transmission line, and alerts the officers monitoring the system of any trouble or alarm. This system should be a stand-alone, computer controlled system with emergency power back-up.

Before any system can be implemented, a determination must be made as to the type and number of alarms required, and have the capability for expansion. The alarm system utilized should be capable of monitoring all alarms within the complex (e.g., exterior perimeter, interior, and duress "panic" alarms).

## **RECOMMENDATION #42:**

Design, procure and implement a stand-alone, computer-controlled alarm monitoring system.

## **RECOMMENDATION #43:**

Require all alarms to read-out directly to the Control Center.

## **RECOMMENDATION #44:**

Design and implement a preventive maintenance program to decrease trouble calls associated with the alarm systems.

## **RECOMMENDATION #45:**

Develop and implement training for the officers who will monitor the system. This training should include system operation, types of alarms, and response procedures.

Presently, due to ongoing construction projects, the Capitol has the capability of installing various types of alarm devices with minimal disruption. The initial cost of this alarm system will be significant, however, you will find that it will quickly "pay for itself." Developing a

plan of installation that addresses needs in priority order, and expands the system over a period of time, will assist in keeping costs down.

The alarm system can also include monitoring capabilities for other building and environmental support systems and utilities, such as elevators, water pumps, lighting, steam, etc.

## **RECOMMENDATION #46:**

Have all environmental support facilities monitored by the Control Center.

There are presently a few alarm systems used throughout the complex. However, no one really knows or understands the purpose of the alarm, who installed it, when was it installed, who monitors it, or the person to contact in the event of an alarm.

Many types of alarms for intrusion exist. They include magnetic switches, infrared passive (motion) sensor, ultra-sonic, microwave, glass breakage, and break-beam types of alarms. Maintaining security within the complex will best be accomplished through the use of exterior perimeter alarms, interior office alarms, duress "panic" alarms, and utility system alarms.

## **RECOMMENDATION #47:**

Contact a company specializing in security to provide a complete installation package for an alarm system. The intrusion detection package should include alarm monitoring for the following:

- ◆ All doors leading into the building. This would include the tunnel doors that open into the building.
- ◆ All ground floor windows, and some higher elevation windows.
- ◆ Infrared (IR) detectors within the building to monitor the above doors and windows from the inside.
- ◆ Certain accesses into the building which would not normally be used, air vents, rooftop accesses, etc.

This system should also include the installation of an outer perimeter alarm system as follows:

- ◆ Install an outer perimeter alarm system to provide early notification of intrusion in areas that are not actively patrolled by Capitol Police officers. Numerous types of technologies (e.g., microwave, infrared, ported coax cable, fiber optics, etc.) are available on the open market to accomplish this.
- ◆ Install a middle perimeter alarm system to detect any activity close to the buildings after hours.

## **Office Intrusion Alarm System**

### **RECOMMENDATION #48:**

Install an interior intrusion detection system to monitor offices within the complex. This alarm system would consist of alarm panels, power supplies, sensors, and a keyless control pad which arms and disarms the system. All alarms should read-out directly to the Control Center. In addition, local audible alarms (e.g., siren, horn, etc.) may be used.

### **RECOMMENDATION #49:**

Install intrusion detection systems in the following offices:

- ◆ the Governor's office
- ◆ The State Treasurer's office
- ◆ the Senate Chambers
- ◆ State check processing center
- ◆ State Tax office
- ◆ any other offices housing security items such as money, personnel records, etc, or requiring increased protection.



The State's payroll check stock is currently stored in a closet. The closet was locked, but no alarm was present and no real physical security was in place. The police force was unaware that the check stock was being stored in the closet.

### **RECOMMENDATION #50:**

Install high security locks and alarm the door to the check stock storage closet. The alarm should read-out directly to the Control Center.

## **Duress "Panic" Alarm System**

The Capitol building, because of its openness to the general public, and the type of services provided should consider the installation of a duress "panic" alarm system to allow the quick response of law enforcement personnel.

### **RECOMMENDATION #51:**

Install duress "panic" alarms in the following offices:

- ◆ the Governor's office
- ◆ the State Treasurer's office

- ◆ the Senate Chambers
- ◆ State check processing center
- ◆ State Tax office
- ◆ any other offices housing security items such as money, personnel records, etc., or requiring increased protection

### **RECOMMENDATION #52:**

As previously recommended; install duress "panic" alarms at all entry points, both manned and unmanned, with read-out directly to the Control Center.

### **RECOMMENDATION #53:**

Require the individual offices within the Capitol building to submit requests for additional duress "panic" alarms through the police force.

### **RECOMMENDATION #54:**

Require all alarms to read-out directly to the Control Center.

## **Locking Hardware and Key Control Systems**

Much of the locking hardware used throughout the Capitol complex is not of a high security type. The key system currently used in the Capitol complex is commercially available, thereby allowing for the duplication of the keys and cores. The key control is inconsistent, compromising the integrity of the security of the Capitol complex. There is no accurate account of all of the keys issued. Currently, the cleaning crew, mail room personnel and many others have keys, and have what may be considered free access to most of the high security areas within the Capitol complex. Law enforcement personnel currently have to contact the appropriate office to gain access.

### **RECOMMENDATION #55:**

Relocate the present Lock Shop under the Office of Security.

## **RECOMMENDATION #56:**

Establish a proprietary key system throughout the complex to ensure the integrity of the security systems. This would give the Capitol complex its own key system and eliminate the key blanks and cores that are commercially available on the open market.

## **RECOMMENDATION #57:**

Design and implement a key control system. Require the police force to maintain the system, thereby centralizing and controlling the issuance of keys.

## **RECOMMENDATION #58:**

After the key control system is in place, install a high security locking hardware system throughout the Capitol complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #59:**

In conjunction with the installation of the key control and high security locking hardware systems, develop and implement an escort system in order to maintain the integrity of high security areas. This escort system should be organized through the police Control Center. The escort system would require security personnel to unlock doors and escort individuals into high security areas after hours. Upon completion of the work, the officers would then secure these areas.

## **RECOMMENDATION #60:**

Require the police force to issue keys, upon written request and approval, in order to ensure that only authorized individuals receive keys.

## **RECOMMENDATION #61:**

Assign master keys to the police officers, for all areas, in order for them to conduct after hours duties and respond to bomb threats, intrusion and duress alarms, fires, or any other emergency situations.

## **RECOMMENDATION #62:**

When/If high security locking hardware is installed, establish a system of indexed key and lock control files.

## **RECOMMENDATION #63:**

Use one (1) or more qualified, full-time locksmiths to maintain and ensure the integrity of the lock and key system. The use of outside locksmiths should not be used, since it could compromise the entire system.

The following is an example of a key and lock control index maintenance system:

### **Key Control**

- ◆ Maintain a signature card for permanently issued keys. Keys must be returned in order for the person to be cleared out of the system at the termination of employment or a change in work areas.
- ◆ Keys must be nontransferable.
- ◆ Each key must have a serial number stamped on it.
- ◆ Establish two (2) card files or a computer database for key control. Each card file should be cross referenced to the other. The first card file should be indexed alphabetically by the name of the individuals who have been issued keys permanently. The card should include the date the key was issued, the room number and the name of the office or area the individual occupies, the key number and the master key level indicator (i.e., A1 sub/area master key, A1-2 operating/change key, etc.). The second card file should contain the data information on the key and should be indexed numerically by the serial number on the key. This file should also contain the same information as the first card file.
- ◆ Maintain a key filing cabinet. A tagged original key should be kept in this cabinet for every change in the system. The tag, as well as the original key, should be marked with its change number. Extra operating keys for the system should also be stored in this cabinet.
- ◆ Maintain a sign-out book for control of any temporary issued keys.

### **Lock Core/Cylinder Control**

- ◆ Each lock has a specific core or cylinder associated with it.
- ◆ Each lock core must have a core change number stamped on it. This is the same number as indicated on the Master key system.



- ◆ Each core must also have a core number stamped on it on the opposite side from the core change number.
- ◆ Establish two (2) card files for lock core control. The first card should contain the lock core data and should be indexed by the specific core number associated with each core change and the specific location. The first card should also contain the cutting information, and any core pinning information for the locksmith. The second card should be indexed by the location of where the core was installed. The card should also contain the specific core number associated with the core change number. No key cutting or core pinning information should be kept on this card.

### **RECOMMENDATION #64:**

Install locking hardware in order for the Capitol Police and/or Members to "lockdown" doors in an emergency situation. This system could be used in a hostage situation or if a gunman should enter the building.

### **RECOMMENDATION #65:**

Install an emergency locking door system on all doors leading to certain offices and areas, to include the doors associated with the Galleries, for a crash (lockdown) situation. This system can be easily installed and will greatly enhance the physical security of the Governor's Office and Senate Chambers. This system will hold the doors open in normal conditions by use of an electromagnetic device which holds a metal plate that is mounted on the door. The electromagnet can be controlled by a pushbutton, that when depressed, will cause the door to close and lock automatically.

The following are specific installation recommendations for the emergency locking door system:

- ◆ Install the push buttons flush mounted and spring loaded to prevent accidental activation.
- ◆ Use the same type of device to keep the doors closed when the system is activated.
- ◆ Connect this system to a back-up power supply to prevent the system from failing during a power outage.

# Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems

Installation of a closed circuit television (CCTV) system is not intended to replace police force personnel. The cameras give the control center the capability of monitoring activity within the Capitol complex. Video cameras are positioned and deployed to serve two basic functions in a secure environment: the first is video assessment of a penetrated alarm point (i.e., to allow observation of a very specific area with a fixed camera and lens with a specific focal point and focus). The second function is to use a camera for investigative/observation purposes. In order to perform the second function, pan/tilt/zoom controlled cameras are installed to monitor a large area and follow events within the secure environment. CCTV systems, used in conjunction with a video motion detection system, gives the control center the capability of monitoring areas not posted with police force personnel.

Today's technology has allowed pan/tilt/zoom cameras to do the job of overall surveillance and close point monitoring. Because of increased motor speed and lens flexibility, one pan/tilt/zoom camera can monitor the same area as several fixed lens cameras. As a result, use of the more expensive pan/tilt/zoom cameras, where applicable, is actually more cost effective. However, in many applications, such as entryways and window observation, the fixed lens camera remains the best video alternative.

## **RECOMMENDATION #66:**

A CCTV system survey should be conducted that consists of Capitol's Electrical Engineer's Office, the Capitol Police Security Coordination Team (this would have to be appointed), the General Services Administration, and if necessary the Building Architectures Office.

## **RECOMMENDATION #67:**

Install exterior cameras to monitor the Capitol building. These cameras should be mounted on the rooftops of other surrounding buildings looking back to the Capitol.

## **RECOMMENDATION #68:**

As previously recommended, install cameras outside of the buildings to view the complex. These cameras should be pan/tilt/zoom lens, encased in environmental enclosures with heat, fans, and window wipers. These cameras should be used to

provide surveillance of the outer perimeter, video assessment of perimeter alarms, and observation of perimeter posts.

### **RECOMMENDATION #69:**

As previously recommended, install cameras to monitor all exterior doorways and windows. Cameras should be installed in such a way that a minimal number of cameras are required to provide 100% coverage.

### **RECOMMENDATION #70:**

Install interior cameras throughout the Capitol building to serve as a tool for monitoring the public. Conduct a survey to determine the number of cameras that will be needed to monitor the inside of the Capitol, to include; all halls, senate chambers, and large areas that are utilized for public gatherings.

### **RECOMMENDATION #71:**

Implement video recording capability in the Control Center to record, when necessary, certain events, such as large crowd gatherings, or to record an incident for later viewing.

### **RECOMMENDATION #72:**

Install cameras in all tunnels for full monitoring.

### **RECOMMENDATION #73:**

Design and implement a preventive maintenance program to decrease maintenance problems related to the video system. This program should include periodic training of all personnel who use the video system.

### **RECOMMENDATION #74:**

Connect perimeter cameras to a video camera motion detection system for monitoring post/perimeter alarm activations after hours. When an alarm is activated, the camera that is monitoring that area will automatically display on a dedicated monitor.

## **RECOMMENDATION #75:**

Install pan/tilt/zoom color cameras to monitor the parking lots for general observation purposes. This will provide the ability to obtain detailed vehicle/pedestrian descriptions and/or identification when needed.

## **RECOMMENDATION #76:**

Due to cost and space needed, it is not realistic or cost effective for each camera to have its own monitor. Install split screen monitors to save both money and space. In the event of an alarm, or through a manual override, the video signal of a single camera can be transferred to a dedicated monitor to improve viewing and identification.

# **Explosive Ordnance Detection and Disposal**

The Capitol Police are responsible for the overall security of the Capitol complex. However, they do not have personnel trained in explosive ordnance detection and disposal. The City of Des Moines Police Department is the closest jurisdiction that has these capabilities. The City police department has qualified bomb technicians and canine handlers. All of these individuals have received explosive ordnance detection and disposal training through formal training courses, annual refresher classes, and in-house training sessions.

In this section, you will find that canine units and/or x-ray machines are used as a tool for sweeping and inspecting packages and that bomb technicians are only used if a suspicious or questionable item is discovered and must be declared or rendered safe.

At present, there are no formally trained explosive ordnance technicians on staff with the Capitol Police. Those individuals that do have responsibility for security within the complex do not have the necessary training to make qualified decision's regarding suspicious packages or items found in or around the Capitol.

## **RECOMMENDATION #77:**

Require Explosive Ordnance Technicians (EOD) and Canine Units to conduct sweeps of press equipment and other items carried by the public into major events at the Capitol.

## **RECOMMENDATION #78:**

Require EOD Technicians and Canine Units to conduct sweeps of Capitol complex buildings after a major event.

## **RECOMMENDATION #79:**

Conduct periodic canine inspections "sweeps" of the exterior of the Capitol building and of all vehicles parked within the Capitol complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #80:**

Increase staffing of the Capitol Police to accommodate EOD and canine technicians in order to provide twenty-four hour coverage at the complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #81:**

Require canine technicians conduct inspections of all deliveries made to the Capitol complex, as well as respond and inspect suspicious vehicles/packages found within the complex.

## **RECOMMENDATION #82:**

Establish a remote delivery-site where all mail and parcels are received, screened, then delivered by State employees. Qualified bomb technicians should be available to inspect suspicious packages received.

## **RECOMMENDATION #83:**

Establish policy and procedures for additional vehicle screening within the complex during major events or times of heightened security.

## **RECOMMENDATION #84:**

During major construction, all trucks and materials used to perform the work should be subject to inspection by canine and EOD personnel.

## **RECOMMENDATION #85:**

Replace any older x-ray machines with new technology (multiple scanning) machines that have backscatter capabilities.

## **RECOMMENDATION #86:**

Require local bomb technicians, Capitol Police officers, and mailroom personnel to attend an x-ray interpretation course. This course is usually provided by the company that furnishes the machine(s). This will allow individuals to train on various types of packages and different types of explosives and/or hazardous chemicals and liquids which could be a threat.

## **RECOMMENDATION #87:**

Provide written procedures to all necessary individuals pertaining to EOD notification and response.

## **Physical Barriers**

There are no physical barriers around the Capitol to prevent a vehicle from crashing into the building, or prevent the threat of a car bombing.

There are two types of physical barriers: one completely closes the roadway by installing a hydraulic blocking system that can be raised and lowered on command. The other slows the speed of an approaching vehicle through a series of weaves and turns. This is usually achieved through the use of concrete barriers that include concrete wall barricades and/or concrete planters with small shrubs.

## **RECOMMENDATION #89:**

Place concrete barriers across the entrances and exits of the driveways to prevent a vehicle from crashing into a building and to maintain vehicular distance from the buildings.

## **Armoring Systems**

Currently, no armor is used within the Capitol building. Armor can be placed in areas where no one would know of its existence. Some armoring comes in the simple form of a protective coating to prevent glass fragmentation, while others include thick glass or steel plates for bullet resistance.

## **RECOMMENDATION #89:**

Install a protective coating on all exterior glass of the Capitol building as well as the other buildings within the complex. The coating is usually made of mylar, or a similar material, and will prevent glass shards from flying into and around the intersection spaces in the event of an explosion or other similar incident.

## **RECOMMENDATION #90:**

Install bullet resistant material on the doors and windows of the Senate Chambers and the Governor's office area.

## **RECOMMENDATION #91:**

Install bullet resistant material on the doors of the offices of the State Treasurer, the check processing center and the tax office.

## **RECOMMENDATION #92:**

Install bullet resistant material on counter tops where the public interfaces with state employees.

# Air Shafts and Air Handler Systems

The air in which we breathe is the most important environment around us. This is an area where physical protection is often overlooked. Due to the threat of fire, that causes smoke, and various types of chemical and biological threats, contamination of the air supply is a considerable threat. The air supply is one of the fastest vehicles to transmit the smallest amount of hazardous material to infiltrate your body.

## **RECOMMENDATION #93:**

Install expanded metal security screens on all openings of the fresh air intakes.

## **RECOMMENDATION #94:**

Lock and chain all outside air intakes to prevent someone from entering. If possible, install intrusion detection alarm sensors.

## **RECOMMENDATION #95:**

Lock and alarm all air handling rooms. Restrict access to authorized personnel.

## **RECOMMENDATION #96:**

Require maintenance personnel to notify security of any suspicious items or activities.

## **RECOMMENDATION #97:**

All alarms should read-out directly to the Control Center.



# Tunnel Security



Presently access to the tunnel is unrestricted. There are no cameras, alarms, or telephones installed within the tunnel. In addition, various utility lines run through the tunnel.

## **RECOMMENDATION #98:**

Restrict access to the tunnel to State employees only.

## **RECOMMENDATION #99:**

Secure all of the doors to the tunnel and install magnetic releases. This will ensure that the doors remain closed and secured.

## **RECOMMENDATION #100:**

Establish video capability at all entrances and exits in the tunnel.

## **RECOMMENDATION #101:**

Install a Public Address system in the tunnel to clear out personnel prior to securing the facility for the evening.

## **RECOMMENDATION #102:**

Place direct drop line telephones on both sides of the doors, for personnel in need of assistance. These telephones should ring directly to the Control Center.

## **RECOMMENDATION #103:**

Establish certain hours that the tunnel can be used.

# **Emergency Power**

Emergency power and lighting should be considered a part of emergency preparedness. Loss of electrical power for even a limited time can have devastating effects on the immediate environment.

## **RECOMMENDATION #104:**

Perform an engineering study to identify current emergency power requirements and additional power consumption requirements for the security system, life safety systems, and the interior/exterior lighting fixtures. Utilize an emergency generator that automatically switches within three (3) seconds to full power operation. Load test the generator annually. At a minimum, 10% of all interior lighting fixtures should be illuminated by the generator. All security systems and communication systems require 100% power back-up. In addition, all control center equipment must be connected to an uninterrupted power supply system which will bridge and filter power fluctuations.

# Summary

The focus of this survey was to develop a security philosophy that would apply to the entire Capitol complex. The survey team did not attempt to address the exact specifications or details for each proposed recommendation. The recommendations contained in this survey report represent an ideal situation and provide a standard for comparison for the level of security that budget and manpower concerns dictate.

The United States Secret Service firmly believes in the importance of cooperation among law enforcement agencies and recognizes that our objectives are primarily the same and that cooperation is necessary to achieve these objectives. This survey is another example of the cooperation that exists between the United States Secret Service and our associates in state government and law enforcement.